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INTRODUCTION

In 1991, the Board of Editors of Natural Resources & Environment' (NR&E) met to determine the themes to be published
in the next volume and considered an entire issue devoted to a
survey of the Endangered Species Act (ESA).2 However, many
editors raised the concern that Congress might complicate the
logistics of publishing such an issue by enacting legislative reform
measures in the middle of the publishing process. After all,
1 Natural Resources & Environment is the quarterly journal of the American Bar Association's Section of Natural Resources, Energy and Environmental Law.
2 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
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reauthorization of the ESA was not only overdue, but a very hot
topic of debate-congressional action had to be imminent, which
would moot the entire ESA issue.
As it turned out, this was a naive assumption. Congress enacted no ESA reform that year, or the next, or the next, or the
next, or the next, or the next, and the idea that Congress would
actually take the bull by the horns and make tough decisions
about one of environmental law's toughest statutes was ingenuous. Fortunately, the proponents of the issue actually won the
debate, and the issue was published in the summer of 1993.
The ESA issue's proponents believed that the issue could
make a difference in the legislative debate over the nation's premier biological resources protection law. However, this too
proved to be naive. Anyone who has followed the ESA debate
knows that the flurries of bills introduced from all sides of the
issue in the last few sessions of Congress haven't amounted to
much more than political posturing and rhetoric.4 On only a few
occasions has a proposal been introduced to Congress that approached comprehensive, balanced reform attracting the approval of a wide cross-section of interest holders. Rather, most
bills have contained wish lists for either preservationists or property rights lobbies, or have purported to offer a balanced approach by simply addressing the non-controversial provisions of
the statute. This is why today, four years after NR&E published
its ESA issue and fifteen years after the ESA was last significantly amended, I believe that Congress will not meaningfully
reform the statute any time soon.
3 See Symposium, Endangered Species Protection, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T, Summer 1993.

4 For a review of some of the ESA reform bills introduced in the 103d and
104th Congresses, see Douglas L. Huth, Endangered Species Act Reauthorization: Congress Proposesa Rewrite With PrivateLandownersIn Mind, 48 Q0a.A.
L. REv. 383 (1995) (discussing bills in 103rd Congress.); Nancy Kubasek et al.,
The Endangered Species Act Tune for a New Approach?, 24 ENV.. L 329
(1994) (same); J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the EndangeredSpecies Act: Rediscovering and Redefining the UntappedPower of FederalAgencies' Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENvr_. L. 1107, 1153-60 (1995) (discussing bills in 104th
Congress) [hereinafter Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1)]; Eva Tompkins, Reauthorization
of the EndangeredSpecies Act-A Comparison of Two Bills that Seek to Reform
the Endangered Species Act Senate Bill 768 and House Bill 2275, 6 Dicm. J.
ENv-I. L. & POL'Y 119 (1997) (same).
5 See RICHARD LrrELt, ENDANGERED AND OTHER PROTECTED SPECIES:
FEDERAL LAW AND REGULATION 10-13 (1992) (describing the amendments to

the ESA and characterizing the extensive 1982 amendments as containing

HeinOnline -- 6 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 369 1997-1998

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal

N.Y U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Volume 6

Specifically, there is virtually no hope that Congress will do
what it should-that is, scrap the ESA entirely and start over by
designing a law that protects both ecosystems and economic interests in an effective, balanced manner. Instead, rhetorical,
picky, and amorphous statutory reform has been proposed which
operates largely at the periphery of the matter and leaves the
most difficult decisions to the agencies that implement the law.
Under this incremental reform, we will not even begin to approach a statutorily-mandated, ecosystem-based method of protecting biological resources and economic interests for many
decades.
So what purpose is served by a law journal article devoted
entirely to the ESA reform process? The answer lies in the fact
that ESA reform no longer is limited to the legislative arena. Indeed, the brightest glimmer of hope for legislative activity rests
with the law's principal implementing agency, the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 6 which, under the direction of
Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, has embarked on an innovative and insightful overhaul of the ESA at the administrative
level. Given that the agency has been pursuing a deliberate administrative reform policy for the past four years, any reasonable
observer would have to confess that FWS is genuinely and aggressively trying to achieve what Congress has thus far been unable or unwilling to achieve-that is, make the ESA work.
In 1994, FWS used the amorphous nature of ESA statutory
script to its advantage and initiated a process that is moving the
ESA towards an ecosystem-based focus with an eye towards a
genuine balance of preservationist and economic interests. Thus,
FWS appears to finally understand that the essence of ESA policy and implementation requires a balance between strong and
"something for everyone" and the limited 1988 amendments as "fairly
technical").
6 The ESA delegates implementation authority to the Secretaries of the Interior (for terrestrial and most freshwater species) and Commerce (for marine
species), see 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (1994), who in turn have delegated that authority to the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMIFS), respectively. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b). Although FWS
and NMFS often jointly issue rules or guidance pertaining to the ESA, references in this Article are principally to FWS as it is the predominant agency in
terms of the number of species under its jurisdiction and its impact on economic
interests, and because it has been the most aggressive in pursuing administrative reform of the program. NMFS's involvement in particular reform measures is noted.
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effective ecosystem protection with a genuine respect for economic interests and those of the regulated community. Of
course, the proper balance point is in the eyes of the beholder,
and to many interested persons joining in the debate, "balance"
is a four letter word. Clearly, FWS has not escaped criticism for
its efforts from both preservationist and economic interests at
their extremes.
However, to those observers in the "radical center," FWS's
critics are considered to be short-sighted and narrow-minded.
No matter what pops out of the congressional black box, no matter when it emerges, and no matter how much praise and criticism are heaped upon Congress's carefully drafted words, the
reality is that legislative reform most likely will leave all of the
tough decisions to FWS. These centrists believe that, since the
Act gives the agency discretion to follow this course (as this Article argues), the FWS should do so.
This is not to say that the legislative arena should be ignored. Rather, legislative reform should still be pursued with the
objective of facilitating FWS's efforts. However, since this Article focuses chiefly on the administrative side of the reform process, except as it pertains directly to FWS's reform agenda,
others are left with the task of elaborating on the legislative dimension.7 In Part I of the Article, the efforts that FWS has already undertaken to overhaul ESA policy and implementation
are discussed. Specifically, FWS's attempts to reorient central
ESA functions towards an ecosystem-based focus, and to adopt
innovative policies designed to integrate property owners and
other economic interests into the ecosystem protection process,
are analyzed. These efforts are significant since they forged a
policy nucleus around which true ESA reform can be molded.
It would be a mistake, however, for FWS to stop here. The
momentum that FWS has gained in the past two years could propel ESA reform forward exponentially. Thus, in Part II of this
Article, an agenda for additional ESA reforms that could be implemented at the administrative level is outlined. These reforms
7 For comprehensive discussions of the core ESA programs, see DA m.L J.
RoHL', THE ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr. A Gums TO ITS PRoTEcTIoNs AND

(1992); Oliver A. Houck, The EndangeredSpeciesAct and Its
Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 277 (1993); James C. Kilbourne, The Endangered Species Act
IMPLEmENTAToN

Under a Microscope.: A Closeup Look From a Litigator's Perspective, 21

ENvrLi

L. 499 (1991); LrrrEu, supra note 5.
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could advance ecosystem and economic interests further than
those advanced by FWS so far, without sacrificing balance and
effectiveness, by demonstrating that there is a substantial middle
ground for reform and that the current focus on rhetoric and incrementalism must be eliminated. FWS's aggressiveness in this
regard is very important because the sooner FWS pursues these
additional reforms, the more likely the agency will be able to
shape legislative outcomes.
In recognition that Congress recently appears to have noticed what FWS has done and has provided an early indication of
what it thinks in the form of a legislative ESA reform proposal,
Part II of the Article discusses how successful FWS might be in
turning its administrative reform agenda into legislative reform.
Although it is too soon to tell what, if anything, Congress will
produce in the way of ESA reform, it is at least clear that several
of FWS's major reform measures are serving as the starting
points for current legislative efforts. Therefore, it may turn out
that the most important accomplishment of FWS's administrative
reform agenda is that it breaks the congressional logjam that has
stalled ESA reform for so long-and that alone would be quite
an accomplishment.
I
THE RECORD OF ESA ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

The opening salvo in FWS's administrative reform effort
came in March 1994 with the agency's publication of An Ecosystem Approach to Fish and Wildlife Conservation (Ecosystem Approach).8 The agency portrayed the Ecosystem Approach as its
blueprint for "managing and protecting ecosystems." 9 The document did not directly implement or propose substantive changes
to ESA implementation policy. Rather, it (i) outlined common
principles of the ecosystem approach 10 and guidelines for de8 U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, AN ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION: AN APPROACH TO
MoRE EFFECrIVELY CONSERVE THE NATION'S BIODIVERSITY (1994) [hereinaf-

ter ECOSYSTEM APPROACH].
9 Id. at 5.
10 See id. (focusing on biodiversity conservation; goal definition on ecosystem-wide bases; integration of socioeconomic factors; quality of science; flexibility of approach; and partnerships with other federal, state, local, tribal,
public, and private interests).
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lineation of ecosystem boundaries;" (ii) provided an evaluation

of identified ecosystem units in terms of resources, threats, and
management options; 12 and (iii) illustrated the agency's approach
to planning and action frameworks.1 However, specific ESA
policy changes were to follow eventually.

Twelve months later, FWS added the second prong to its reform effort with the publication of ProtectingAmerica's Living
Heritage: A Fair, Cooperativeand Scientifically Sound Approach
4
to Improving the Endangered Species Act (Fair Approach).'
This document outlined the agency's plan to provide "effective
conservation of endangered and threatened species and fairness

to people through innovative, cooperative, and comprehensive
approaches."1 5 Ten principles for federal ESA policy were outlined, each of which detailed the administrative reforms that the
as
agency had recently implemented, or would soon propose,
16
well as the legislative reforms the agency would support.
These two publications unmistakably signaled FWS's initiation of an administrative reform designed to move the agency
and the ESA into the ecosystem era consistent with (or at least
not entirely inconsistent with) property fights and economic interests. Whereas Ecosystem Approach has served as the agency's
basis for ecosystem policy changes,' 7 FairApproach has served as
11 See id. at 6 (adopting a delineation system based on fifty-tvro watershed
units identified in the U.S. Geological Survey Hydrologic Unit Map).
12 See id. at 7 (identifying resource significance, risks to the resource, administrative response resources, and partnership opportunities as its principal
ecosystem evaluation criteria).
13 See id. at 8-9 (outlining FWS's approach for moving from identifying natural resource needs to setting resource goals and objectives, implementing solutions, monitoring, and reporting).
14 U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, PROTECTING
AMEmcA's LrvNG HERITAGrE: A FAIR, COOPERATIVE AND SCIENTIFICALLY
SouND APPROACH TO ImpROVING THE ENDANGERED SPECIES Act (1995) (issued jointly with NMFS) [hereinafter FAIR APPROACH].

15 Id. at 1.
16 See id. at 3-4 (focusing on FWS's principles of increasing the quality of
science; minimizing social and economic impacts; improving communication
with landowners; treating of landowners fairly, providing conservation incentives to landowners; making more effective use of federal resources; preventing
species from needing to be listed; recovering those species that are listed;
adopting more efficient and consistent polices between FWS and NMFS; and
including state, tribal, and local entities in ESA policy).

17 FWS revised its EcosYsTEm APPROACH document in April 1996 in the
form of an updated internal policy guidance manual. See U.S. FISH AND Wn.Li SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FWM RELFAsE No. 251, EcosYsma.t APPROACH TO FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION (1996). The agency has also
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the blueprint for policies directed at property rights and economic interests. 18 The policies that have emanated from these
two efforts are continuing to evolve, and at times, the two reform
paths seem to be more independent than coordinated. But after
several years of following such policies, FWS has fundamentally
changed the look and feel of the ESA without Congress altering
a single word in the statute. 19
A.

Ecosystem Approach Policies

Ecosystem Approach initiated a reorientation of ESA implementation towards the ecosystem unit (i.e., the building block of
conservation policy according to emerging principles of conservation biology2 °) and biodiversity (i.e., the basic measure of ecosysprovided a plain-English explanation of its basic ECOSYSTEM APPROACH policy
objective. See Denise Henne, Taking an Ecosystem Approach, U.S. Fish and

Wildlife Serv., U.S.

DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ENDANGERED SPECiES BULL., Jan.-

Feb. 1995, at 22.
18 FWS recently confirmed its commitment to the Fair Approach philosophy
in a document that explains the agency's current thinking on each element of
the agenda and provides implementation examples from the field. See U.S.
FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, MAKING THE ESA WORK
BETTER:

(1997) (is-

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 10 POINT PLAN AND BEYOND
THE ESA WoRK BETIR].

sued jointly with NMFS) [hereinafter MAKING

19 The purpose of this Article is to describe the breadth and central objectives of FWS's administrative reform effort. Although the body of literature
pertaining to most of the policy initiatives is sparse, references are provided to
the more detailed commentaries.
20 The discipline of conservation biology has emerged as a biological sciences discipline largely in the past decade, as traced by its chief literature and
research outlet called Conservation Biology. A focal point of discipline has
been to demonstrate the often pernicious effects of habitat fragmentation and
loss on species. It appears to be indisputable, for example, that a circular preserve of 1,000 contiguous acres offers more ecological value to many species
than would ten unconnected amoeba-shaped preserves of 100 acres each.
Smaller preserve structures increase the total linear "edge" of preserve boundaries, which can present opportunities to predators, and many species have been
demonstrated to depend on a minimum "patch size" of habitat in order to carry
out essential breeding, feeding, and sheltering functions. See Denis A. Saunders et al., Biological Consequences of Ecosystem Fragmentation: A Review, 5
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 18 (1991). Often the adverse effects of habitat fragmentation and loss exhibit themselves not incrementally, but with a nonlinear
threshold effect that appears seemingly without warning and thereafter is difficult to reverse. See Kimberly A. With & Thomas 0. Crist, CriticalThresholds
In Species' Responses to Landscape Structure, 76 ECOLOGY 2446 (1995) (arguing that while these factors may be difficult to measure in specific species contexts, it seems widely agreed in the scientific community that they exist in
general and pose significant challenges for preserve design and management for
many species, thus having important implications for the ESA program).
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tern health2 1). The new policy model that has emerged from the
combination of those concepts is known as "ecosystem management."22 Although the ESA expresses its primary purpose as the
conservation of ecosystems upon which endangered species depend,2 the statute has been roundly criticized for not following
through with coherent ecosystem management measures.2 4 In21 Biodiversity is "[tihe variety of organisms considered at all levels, from
genetic variants belonging to the same species through arrays of species to arrays of genera, families, and still higher taxonomic levels ...." EDWARD 0.
WILSON, THE DrwRsrry OF LwE 393 (1992); see also U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTEMCION AGENCY, THREATS TO BIOLOGICAL
STATES 10 (1990) (stating that biological diversity

DrvERsrry IN

THE

UNrrwD

"is the variety of life on all
levels of organization, represented by the number and relative frequencies of
items"). The focus of scientific research geared towards ecosystem-level dynamics has revealed the dramatic impacts habitat loss has had on biodiversity generally. See, eg., U.S. DEP'T OF INTEmRoR, OUR LimrG RESOURCES (1995); Nat'I
Biological Serv., U.S. Dep't of Interior, Biological Rep. 28, Endangered Ecosystems of the United States: A Preliminary Assessment of Loss and Degradation
(1995). For a summary of the biodiversity conservation policy formulation initiatives of eighteen federal agencies, see CONGRESSiONAL RESEARCH SERvic,
EcosYsamM MANAGEmNT. FEDERAL AGENCY AcrvrrEs, CRS Rep No. 94339 (1994).
22 See TH KEYSTONE CENTER, Ti KEYSrONE CENTER NATIONAL PoucY
DrALOGUE ON EcosysEM MANAGEMENT (1996) [hereinafter KEYSTONE DIAr
MANAGEMENT]; STEVEN YAFFEE Er AL., TIE NViDER.
LOGUE ON EcosYsTE
NEss SocIETY, ECOSYSTEM Management in the United States (1996);
Symposium, The Ecosystem Approadti New Departuresfor Land and Water, 24
ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1997). Considerable debate remains over the practical implications of the ecosystem management policies. Compare R. Edward
Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BioLoGY 27
(1994) (advocating movement towards this approach) and R Edward
Grumbine, Reflections on "What is Ecosystem Management?", 11 CONSERVA-ION BIOLOGY 41 (1997) (same), with Rebecca W. Thomson, "Ecosystem Management" Great Idea, But What Is 14 Widl It Work, and Who Will Pay?, NAT.
RnsouIcEs & ENV'T, Winter 1995, at 42 (pointing out difficulties of the
approach).
23 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c) (1994).
24 See Holly Doremus, Patdingthe Ark Improving Legal Protectionof Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L. Q. 265, 304-17 (1991); James Drodzdowski,
Saving an EndangeredAct The Case for a BiodiversityApproadt to ESA Conservation Efforts, 45 CAsE W. RES. L. REv. 553, 567-85 (1995); Andrew A.
Smith et al., The Endangered Species Act at Tiventy: An Analytical Survey of
Federal Endangered Species Protection, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J.1027, 1069-72
(1993). Several commentators contend, however, that the species-oriented approach of the ESA is both essential and working. See Oliver A. Houck, On the
Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 MiNN. L REv. 869, 959
(1997) ("Those who contend that the ESA is deficient because it fails to address
biological diversity and ecosystem management on a broad enough scale...
simply have not opened their eyes"); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Noah By the Numbers: An EmpiricalEvaluationof the EndangeredSpecies Act, 82 CoNEL L
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stead, the ESA relies on identification and protection of individual endangered species.
Unfortunately, FWS does not have the discretion to replace
the species-by-species approach with an ecosystem protection
program that protects ecosystems independent of the existence
of endangered species. However, nothing in the ESA forbids the
agency from considering ecosystem factors when taking actions
relevant to the species-by-species statutory framework. Thus, for
example, to determine whether a species is endangered, FWS
may delineate and evaluate the relevant ecosystem. Further, to
determine how to promote conservation of endangered species,
the agency might consider how to protect the species' entire
ecosystem possibly providing protections to other species as well.
As the agency declared in Ecosystem Approach, all aspects of
FWS's ESA program can integrate some measure of ecosystembased orientation, even though the ultimate actions under the
present ESA framework must be directed towards species-based
outcomes.
Indeed, this is precisely the direction in which FWS headed
with its set of policy changes that it set forth after articulating its
Ecosystem Approach philosophy. Advocates of extreme property rights' protections who ignore these biological and political
realities are, to borrow a phrase, in danger of extinction.
1. An Ecosystem Approach Policy for the ESA
FWS's first ecosystem-based reform effort came in July 1994
with the agency's publication of a policy document translating
the broad Ecosystem Approach philosophy into the relevant
ESA language.25 The policy focuses on three core ESA programs that FWS implements: (i) recovery planning;26 (ii) interREv. 356 (1997) (using statistical analysis to demonstrate some successes of the
ESA program).
25 Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy for the Ecosystem Approach to
the Endangered Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,273 (1994) (issued jointly with
NMFS). The stated purpose of the policy is to "promote healthy ecosystems
through activities undertaken by the Service under the authority of the Endangered Species Act." Id. at 34,274
26 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1994) (requiring that FWS and NMFS "develop
and implement plans... for the conservation and survival of endangered species and threatened species"). For an overview of the history and potential of
the recovery planning process under section 4(f) of the ESA, see Rohlf, supra
note 7, at 87-92; Frederico M. Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of
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agency cooperation 27and (iii) species listings.2 8 FWS stated that
its policy would be to incorporate ecosystem considerations into
actions taken under each of these programs.2 Thus, FWS will (i)
"develop and implement recovery plans for communities or ecosystems where multiple listed and candidate species occur;" 30 (ii)
develop interagency conservation efforts "in a manner that restores, reconstructs, or rehabilitates the structure, distribution,
connectivity and function upon which those listed species depend;" 31 and (iii) group species listing actions based on a "geographic, taxonomic, or ecosystem basis.13 2 FWS proclaimed that
these approaches would apply agency-wide for all listed species,
33
as broadly under the ESA as possible.
2. An Ecosystem Approach to Recovery Plans

Nothing in the relevant recovery planning provisions of the
ESA suggests an ecosystem orientation to the recovery planning
and implementation process. However, ,VS gave its general
ESA ecosystem approach policy more specific meaning in a simultaneously published policy covering recovery plans for listed
Thinking About the Endangered Species Act, 23 EcoLooY LQ. 1 (1996);
Houck, supra note 7, at 344-51.

27 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994) (setting forth a complicated set of provisions flowing from the duty of federal agencies to consult with FWS and
NMFS to "insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such
agency... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined... to be critical"). Fbr an
overview of the interagency consultation procedure under section 7 of the ESA,
see Rohlf, supra note 7, at 105-36; Houck, supra note 7, at 315-29; Kilbourne,
supra note 7, at 530-64.
28 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (1994) (requiring FWS and NNIFS to designate
any species of plant or animal the continued existence of which is "endangered" or "threatened"). As of June 30, 1997, FWS and NMFS had classified
449 animal species found in the United States as endangered or threatened and
641 plant species found in the United States as endangered or threatened. U.S.

FIsH

AND WIDI.

SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ENDANGERED SPECIES

BuLz., July-Aug., 1997, at 28. For an overview of the definitions and procedures used for listing species under section 4 of the ESA, see Rohlf, supra note
7, at 37-49; Houck, supra note 7, at 280-96; J.B. Ruhi, Section 4 of the ESAThe Cornerstone of Species Protection Law, NAT. RESOURCES & E,'Zv'T, Summer 1993, at 26 [hereinafter Ruhl, Section 4].
29 See Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy for the Ecosystem Approach to the Endangered Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. at 34,274.
30 Id
31 Id.
32I1&
33

Id
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species. 34 FWS's policy statement explicitly incorporated the
ecosystem factor into recovery planning by (i) requiring "the
range or ecosystem of the species" 35 to be one of the factors considered in developing methods for recovery plan preparation and
(ii) mandating the qualifications for recovery planning team
membership to include an individual's expertise with respect to
the species or the ecosystem of which the species is a part (or
may become a part). 36 Hence, although the FWS must focus recovery planning on individual species, the policy recognizes that
a species' recovery generally is closely related to its relationship
with the ecosystems on which it depends. This new focus has al37
ready left its mark on recovery planning.
3. Implementing Federal Agency Conservation Duties Under
Section 7(a) (1)
Section 7(a)(1) of the ESA directs that all federal agencies
"shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of
[the ESA] by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species ..... 3s To give that
duty more concrete meaning, twelve federal agencies united with
the FWS and the NMFS on September 27, 1994 in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to confirm the agencies' "common goal of conserving species listed as threatened or
endangered under the [ESA] by protecting and managing their
populations and the ecosystems upon which those populations
depend."39
34 See id. The recovery planning policy also contains elements responding to
the Fair Approach effort. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
35 Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy for the Ecosystem Approach to
the Endangered Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. at 34,273.

36

See id.

37 FWS reports that it currently is working on a recovery plan for the South
Florida Ecosystem that would encompass 68 federally-listed species and another 300 species. See MAN NG THE ESA WoRK BETrER, supra note 18, at 20;
see also 62 Fed. Reg. 51,128 (1997) (draft recovery plan addressing 34 species of
which 11 are listed under the ESA); 62 Fed. Reg. 51,126 (1997) (draft recovery
plan for seven plants and a butterfly).
38 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1994).
39 Memorandum of UnderstandingBetween FederalAgencies on Implementation of the EndangeredSpecies Act, signed Sept. 28, 1994, DALY ENV'T REP.,
Sept. 30, 1994, at E-1, availablein WESTLAW, 1994 DEN 188d36 [hereinafter
MOU]. The signatory agencies, besides FWS and NMFS, are the Forest Service, Department of Defense, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Bureau
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The import of that agreement should not be underestimated.
These fourteen MOU agencies are responsible for the management of almost 600 million surface acres of the United States,
hundreds of reservoir areas, and thousands of miles of river and

stream corridors.4o They implement dozens of federal environmental laws applicable to public and private entities on federal
and nonfederal lands. 41 Consequently, their administrative programs form no less than the core of federal environmental law
and policy.

The MOU clearly enhances the role of section 7(a)(1) in
ESA policy by solidifying the link between section 7(a)(1) and
the agencies' new ecosystem management theme. For example,
the operative terms of the MOU commit each party to working
towards the conservation of species and their ecosystems.42 Furof Land Management, Bureau of Mines, Bureau of Reclamation, Minerals
Management Service, National Park Service, Coast Guard, Federal Aviation
Administration, Federal Highway Administration, and Environmental Protection Agency.
40 Several of the signatory agencies have substantial public land and water
resource management responsibilities, including the Bureau of Land Management (270 million surface acres in 29 states); Bureau of Reclamation (300 reservoirs and several thousand miles of river and stream corridors); Department of
Defense (25 million surface acres); Forest Service (191 million acres in 43
states); and National Park Service (80 million acres in 367 units of the National
Park System). See id. at 2-4, availablein WESTLAW, 1994 DEN 188d36, at *48.
41 For example, the United States Environmental Protection Agency administers laws regulating water pollution (Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511387 (1994 & Supp. I 1995)), air pollution (Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 74017671q (1994 & Supp. 11995)), solid waste management (Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994 & Supp. I 1995)), and
remediation of contaminated properties (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp.
I 1995)); the Corps of Engineers administers the program for permitting discharges of fill material in wetlands (Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994));
and the Coast Guard administers coastal pollution response authorities (Oil
Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995)).
42 The MOU prescribes that each party to the MOU will, among other
things:
1. "Identify opportunities to conserve Federally listed species and the ecosystems upon whid those species depend within its existing programs or
authorities."
2. "Determine whether its respective planning processes effectively help
conserve threatened and endangered species and the ecosystems upon
which those species depend."
3. "Use existing programs, or establish a program if one does not currently exist, to evaluate, recognize, and reward the performance and
achievements of personnel who are responsible for planning or imple-
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ther, the MOU defines specific tasks that the agencies (called the
"Cooperators") will implement and sets forth two interagency
working group structures through which such tasks shall be implemented. First, the agencies will establish regional interagency
working groups in identified geographical areas to coordinate
ageny actions, create opportunities, and overcome barriers such
that listed species and the ecosystems upon which they depend are
conserved.43 Second, the agencies will create a national interagency ESA working group to "identify and coordinate improvements in Federal implementation of the ESA.' '44 This effort shall
include the requirement that each agency "[i]dentify ways to improve conservation of [listed] species... including protection of
the ecosystems upon which they depend, in agency planning
processes and other agency programs. '45 Hence, although it remains to be seen whether the MOU will transform Section
7(a)(1) from a dormant clause to a potent force in the movement
towards an ecosystem-based approach to the ESA,46 the MOU
has at least cemented FWS's commitment to permeating all ESA
programs with the Ecosystem Approach philosophy.
4.

Testing the Limits of the ESA Ecosystem Approach in the
Policy on Distinct Populations

One of the most controversial features of the ESA is the
degree to which its legal definition of "species" departs from the
concept as commonly used in the scientific community (which itself is a matter of debate).4 7 The ESA defines species to include
"any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which
menting programs to conserve or recover listed species or the eco-systems
[sic] upon which they depend."
MOU, supra note 39, at 5, availablein WESTLAW, 1994 DEN 188d36, at *1011 (emphasis added).
43 See id., available in WESTLAW, 1994 DEN 188d36, at *11.
44 Id., available in WESTLAW, 1994 DEN 188d36, at *13.
45 Id. (emphasis added).
46 See, e.g., Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1), supra note 4, at 1144-52.
47 See, e.g., Endangered Species Comm. v. Babbitt, 852 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C.
1994) (ordering public release of copy of scientist's controversial research study
defining taxonomy of species and temporarily continuing the listing of species
as threatened pending review of data); Patrick H. Zaepfel, Legislatingfor Scientific
Uncertainty: Preserving Administrative Flexibility to Interpret "Species"
Under the EndangeredSpecies Act, 4 DicK. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 152 (1995).
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interbreeds when mature," 48 but Congress instructed FWS to use
'49
the "distinct population" element "sparingly.

In February 1996, FWS published a policy regarding the definition of distinct populations that also illustrates the Ecosystem
Approach philosophy at work, as well as its limits. 5 0 FWS declared that once a distinct population is identified according to
specified biological and spatial conditions, listings will be based
on several factors, including the "[p]ersistence of the discrete
population segment in an ecological setting unusual or unique for
the taxon. '' 51 The agency's rationale was that "occurrence in an
unusual ecological setting is potentially an indication that a population segment represents a significant resource of the ldnd
sought to be conserved by the Act."' Although the emphasis of
that approach is on the status of population, the "unusual setting" factor broadens the reach of the ESA as an incidental
means of protecting ecosystems.
Some commenters invited FWS to take the Ecosystem Approach philosophy further, but the agency refused. For example,
one comment argued that FWS should decide the status of a distinct population based on its importance to the environment in
which it occurs.5 3 FWS responded that "[d]espite its orientation
towards conservation of ecosystems, the Services do not believe
that the Act provides authority to recognize a potential [population] as significant on the basis of the importance of its role in the
ecosystem in which it occurs."'54 Similarly, FWS rejected a proposal that it stress uniqueness and irreplaceability of ecological
functions in recognizing distinct populations, because the ESA
"is not intended to establish a comprehensive biodiversity conservation program, and it would be improper for the Services to
recognize a potential [population] and afford it the Act's substantive protections solely or primarily on these grounds. 55
FWS's decisions on these points, both legally accurate, illustrate the boundaries that the ESA currently places on the
16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (1994).
S. Rep. No. 96-151, at 7 (1979). However, FWS can still list such populations when they are endangered or threatened. See id.
50 See Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Vertebrate Population
Segments Under the Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 4722 (1996).
51 Id. at 4725.
52 Id at 4724.
53 See id. at 4723 (publishing recommendations to draft form of policy).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 4724.
48
49
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Ecosystem Approach philosophy. Indeed, FWS cannot completely transform the ESA into the "Endangered Ecosystem
Act." Nevertheless, the care and effort exerted by FWS in integrating ecosystem factors into the analysis of a "distinct population" comes as close to the boundary as legally permitted and
demonstrates that FWS is committed to infusing the ESA with
the Ecosystem Approach philosophy to the maximum extent permitted by the statute.
5.

Promoting Geographicaland Species Breadth Through the
Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook

One of the most sweeping movements in ESA administrative policy is FWS's promotion of habitat conservation planning
processes under section 10(a)(1) of the ESA,5 6 particularly at regional scales. Specifically, section 10(a)(1) allows FWS to authorize actions that would otherwise cause a prohibited take of
listed species, provided the person seeking permission submits a
habitat conservation plan (HCP) detailing the measures the person will employ to avoid, minimize, and mitigate the impacts of
the action on the species. Although the provision was added to
the ESA in 1982,57 the HCP process did not hit its stride until the
1990s. 58 Since 1990, hundreds of HCPs have been approved,
many of which encompass large planning areas that include valu59
able ecosystem features.

56 See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(1) (1994) (illustrating civil penalties for otherwise
prohibited acts).
57 See Albert C. Lin, Comment, Participants'Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestionsfor Streamlining the Process, 23 ECoLoGY L.Q.
369, 375 (1996). Congress was addressing "the concerns of private landowners
who are faced with having otherwise lawful actions not requiring Federal permits prevented by section 9 prohibitions against taking." H.R. REP. No. 97835, at 29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2870.
58 See MAKING THE ESA WoRK BElTMR, supra note 18, at 7. From 1983
through 1992, only 14 HCP permits were issued; whereas by the end of January
1997 over 210 HCP permits had been issued and about 200 HCPs were under
development. The total preserved and developed acreage covered in the HCPs
issued and under development exceeds 18 million acres. See id. For an overview of the emergence of the section 10(a) permitting process during the late
1980s and early 1990s, see J.B. Ruhl, Regional Habitat Conservation Planning
Under the EndangeredSpecies Act: Pushing the Practicaland Legal Limits of
Species Protection,44 Sw. L.J. 1393 (1991); Robert D. Thornton, Searchingfor
Consensus and Predictability: HabitatConservation PlanningUnder the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21 Erjv-L. L. 605 (1991).
59 For comprehensive overviews of the current state of the HCP program,
see Lin, supra note 57, at 381-88 and Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered
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One problem with the HCP experience has been that no established procedures or guidelines existed for preparing and
evaluating HCPs.60 However, FWS has rectified this deficiency
largely through its publication in November 1996 of the Habitat
Conservation Planning Handbook (HCP Handbook).61
Although the HCP Handbook is primarily a process oriented
tool that FWS portrays chiefly as a component of its Fair Approach philosophy (as evidenced by the process streamlining
measures that are included), 62 the document is also an ingredient
of the Ecosystem Approach philosophy. Clearly, the HCPHandbook does not scream out ecosystem-based criteria as loudly as
does the section 7(a)(1) MOU, but the intent is unmistakable.
For example, the HCP Handbook encourages HCP applicants to "consider as large and comprehensive a plan area as is
feasible and consistent with their land or natural resource use
authorities. '63 This regional approach allows the HCP to serve
as an umbrella for a variety of ESA issues and to maximize mitigation options.64 Similarly, just as FWS encourages geographical
breadth, the HCP Handbook also encourages species breadth by
inviting HCP applicants to "include as many proposed and candidate species as can be adequately addressed and covered by the
permit." 65 One advantage of doing so, besides protecting the
HCP applicant from additional planning and mitigation burdens
if the unlisted species later becomes listed, is to increase the biological value of an HCP "through comprehensive multi-species
or ecosystem planning that provides early, proactive consideraSpecies Act A Case Study in Takings and Incentives, 49 STAN. L REv. 305
(1997).
60 FWS's regulations covering the HCP process do not substantively expand
upon the statutory text. Compare 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b) (1985) and 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.32(b) (1985) with 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(1) (1994).
61 See U.S. FIsH AND WnuLiFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INT RIOR, ENDAN.
GERED SPECIES HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK

(1996) (is-

sued jointly with NMFS) [hereinafter HCP HANDBOOK]; see also 61 Fed. Reg.
63,854 (1996) (announcing availability of HCP Handbook and responding to
comments on Draft HCP Handbook).
62 See discussion infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
63

HCP

HANDBOOK,

supra note 61, at 3-11. Some conservation biologists

believe the important focus should be on the species' "core area"---the portion
of the species' home range that receives disproportionate use by the species.
See Bruce B. Bingham & Barry R. Noon, Mitigation of Habitat "Take': Application to Habitat Conservation Planning, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 127
(1997).
64
65

See HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 61, at 3-11.
Id. at 4-1.
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tion of the needs of unlisted species." 66 Because of the ESA's
species-based orientation, FWS wisely falls short of describing
HCPs as an ecosystem planning tool in these respects. Indeed,
some critics charge that HCPs in general do not go far enough
towards protection of species, much less ecosystems. 67 But the
agency's encouragement of regional plans and HCPs that cover
unlisted species cannot be mistaken for anything other than
Ecosystem Approach taking hold.
6. Promoting ProactiveMeasures Through CandidateSpecies
Conservation Agreements

One of the tremendous shortcomings of the ESA is that it
leaves unlisted "species of concern" or "candidate species" un68
protected until FWS lists them as endangered or threatened.
Once a species becomes listed and thereby protected, however,
the ESA turns into the pitbull of environmental laws. This toggle-switch approach to species protection embeds perverse incentives to neglect species until they are in need of emergency care.
In particular, as long as protecting an unlisted species does not
benefit a landowner, or makes the landowner's situation worse
by increasing the regulatory impact of a subsequent listing, we
66 Id. There is no "formula" to use to achieve that goal in all contexts.
Rather, planning for multi-species and ecosystem protection depends upon the
complexities of particular settings. See Ronald D. Brunner & Tim W, Clark, A

Practice-BasedApproach to Ecosystem Management, 11 CONSERVATION BioL-

48 (1997); Michael A. O'Connell & Stephen P. Johnson, Improving Habitat
Conservation Planning: The California Natural Community Conservation
oGY

Model, ENDANGERED SPEciEs UPDATE, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 1.
67 See, e.g., Harlan Savage, The Private-LandGamble, DEFENDERS, Summer

1997, at 22; Fraser Shilling, Do HabitatConservation Plans Protect Endangered
Species?, 276 Sci. 1662 (1997); When Habitat Is Not a Home, 276 Sci. 1636
(1997). For a spectrum of views on this issue, see Symposium, Habitat Conservation Planning,ENDANGERED SPEciEs UPDATE, July-Aug. 1997.

63 FWS recently revised its policy for formal designation of candidate status
for species, limiting it to those species that the agency has deemed warranted
for listing as endangered or threatened, but which have not yet been listed by
promulgated regulation. Previously, candidate species were stratified into several categories, the largest of which, now discontinued, included species that
FWS had concluded might be warranted for listing but for which further information would be needed before a final decision could be reached. See Notice
of Final Decision on Identification of Candidates for Listing as Endangered or
Threatened, 61 Fed. Reg. 64,481 (1996) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). The
agency's decision to discontinue its list of those "Category 2" species has been
unpopular with preservationists. See, e.g., Howard M. Crystal, The Elimination
of the Category 2 Candidate Species List: A Prescription for Environmental
Train Wrecks, ENDANGERED SPECiES UPDATE, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 7.
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can hardly expect landowners to go out of their way to promote
such species and the health of their ecosystems.
Through its November 1994 draft guidance on Candidate
Conservation Agreements (CCA), however, FWS began to
change that distorted state of affairs-to the extent that it legally
and reasonably could.69 Although FWS has wrestled with its approach for unlisted species for many years, the agency appeared
to fully grasp the potential ecosystem enhancing powers of unlisted species after Ecosystem Approach was issued. The stumbling block had been whether and how to use CCAs as a means
of avoiding species listings. Whereas the agency's early policies
had been rather miserly in that respect, suggesting that CCAs
should not be used for that purpose,70 the agency shifted its approach in the 1994 draft guidance and solidified CCAs as an important ingredient of the ESA Ecosystem Approach philosophy.
The 1994 CCA draft guidance encouraged the use of CCAs
as a means of negating the threats to a species, thus reducing or
eliminating the prospect that the species will be listed. 1 Provided that the chances of listing without CCA measures are real,
and that the affected landowning and business communities appreciate the rather unpalatable regulatory consequences of such
a listing, it will often behoove economic interests to promote ecological protection through a CCA-that is, to act precisely opposite of the incentives created by the toggle-switch approach of the
statute. The obvious ecological benefits of this new CCA approach did not escape FWS as "[a]n emphasis on early conservation efforts for candidate species allows the Services to seek
69 See U.S. FIsH AND WuLDLIF SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIoR, ENDANGERED SPECIES PROGRAM: CANDIDATE SPECIES GuIDANCE (Draft 1994)

[hereinafter DRAFr CCA GumANcE]; see also Notice of Availability of Draft
Guidance for Candidate Species Under the Endangered Species Act for Review and Comment, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,780 (1994) (announcing availability of

Draft CCA Guidance) [hereinafter Notice of Availability of Draft Guidance].
70 See Memorandum from FWS Associate Director to Regional Directors
Regarding Conservation Agreements (May 20, 1985). During the 1980s, FVS
took a narrow view of CCAs, advising its regional offices that the agency does
"not consider it appropriate to pursue them in lieu of listings." Id.
71 Eliminating the need for listing of a species is included as one of the principal purposes of CCAs, the strategy for which is discussed in detail in the body
of the draft policy. See Diua-r CCA GuIDANcE, supra note 69, at 3 (purposes),
14-16 (strategy). As of April 1997, FIVS has put its new approach into action by
basing several withdrawals of proposals to list species on the existence of a
CCA that was consummated after the proposed listing rule was published. See
MAmNG THE ESA WoRK BE "rR,supra note 18, at 6-7.
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opportunities for Federal and non-Federal entities to stabilize
and recover these species and their ecosystems before listing becomes a high priority." 72

FWS moved these policy approaches into high gear in 1997
with its announcement of a new draft CCA policy73 and a proposed rule-making to formalize the policy as law.74 In this new
draft policy, the FWS recognized more explicitly than ever
before that "by deferring implementation of conservation activities for.., species until they are listed, the ecological integrity of
their habitats is compromised thereby severely limiting recovery
options." 75 Thus, the draft policy completes the agency's turnaround on the question of using CCAs to avoid listing, stating in
no uncertain terms that "the ultimate goal of Candidate Conservation Agreements developed under this policy is to... nullify
the need to list [species] as endangered or threatened. '76 Furthermore, the proposed rules that implement the new ESA permitting options are designed to provide landowners meaningful
incentives to enter into CCAs that are consistent with the policy.77 Therefore, the new CCA draft policy, in conjunction with
the proposed rules, provides an example of the melding of
Ecosystem Approach and Fair Approach policies-a potential
win-win outcome for species and landowners.
Despite their potential ecological advantages, however, the
practical requirements of making CCAs work have led to dissension among preservationists. Currently, the status quo for the
regulated community is that unlisted species are without protection, and therefore no regulatory consequences flow from "managing" land to reduce their presence. A principal advantage the
regulated community stands to gain from CCAs, and the reason
for making the financial and other conservation commitments
necessary to prompt FWS to enter into a CCA, is the prospect
that FWS will decline to list the candidate species based on the
Notice of Availability of Draft Guidance, supra note 69, at 65,780.
See Announcement of Draft Policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements, 62 Fed. Reg. 32,183 (1997) (issued jointly with NMFS).
74 See Safe Harbor Agreements and Candidate Conservation Agreements,
62 Fed. Reg. 32,189 (1997) (FWS only).
75 Announcement of Draft Policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements,
62 Fed. Reg. at 32,184.
76 Id. at 32,185. The draft policy goes further than the agency's prior guidances to define key terms for CCAs and establish a framework for evaluating
72
73

CCAs in light of the goal of avoiding listings. Id. at 32,186-87.
77 See discussion infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
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conservation benefits established in the CCA. By contrast, the
status quo for preservationists is that a listed species provides a
powerful source of leverage over local and regional land use,
thereby motivating preservationists to list species as surrogates
for broader environmental policy agendas. Yet, the advantage
that preservationists stand to gain from CCAs by foregoing the
species listing is conservation practices by the regulated community that are earlier and more proactive than before-something
that they have proclaimed to want dearly.78 Therefore, to be effective, the CCA policy depends on mutual risk-sharing and sacrifice of the status quo by both sides of that equation.
Thus far, however, preservationists have not taken that
plunge, choosing instead to aggressively challenge CCAs when
the agency uses them as a basis for declining to list a species. 79
Although the cases remain few in number, the courts have for
the most part joined the preservationists, construing the ESA to
preclude FWS from considering the conservation benefits of any
prospective measures in a CCA when deciding the listing status
of a species.80 In doing so, the principal advantage to the regulated community is gutted, and these decisions stand to eliminate
both their ecological and economic benefits. Although FWS has
professed to being undaunted by the adverse court decisions in
its commitment to CCAs,81 it is too early to determine whether
the courts' harsh treatments of CCAs will be an anomaly or a
harbinger of more to come for FWS's reform agenda. As of this
writing, FWS has not finalized the CCA rule, and the future of
CCAs in general seems precarious.
78 See Heather Weiner, Endangered Natural Heritage Act: Strengthening
Amendments to the CurrentESA, ENDANGERED SPECiEs UPDATE, June 1996,
at 4.

79 See, e.g., Letter from Defenders of Wildlife to FWS Re: Draft Policy for
Candidate Conservation Agreements (Aug. 11, 1997) (contending the policy
"will not contribute to the conservation of our nation's declining biological
resources").
SOSee Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. Babbitt, No. MO-96-CA-168 (W.D.

Tex. Mar. 12,1997); Friends of the Wild Swan v. Fish and Wildlife Srv., 945 F.
Supp. 1388 (D. Or. 1996); Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Babbitt, 943 F. Supp. 23
(D.D.C. 1996); Southwest Ctr. v. Babbitt, 939 F. Supp. 49 (D.D.C. 1996). But
see American Fisheries Soc'y v. Verity, No. 88-0174 RAR-JFM (E.D. Cal. Feb.
24, 1989) (concluding FWS must consider prospective benefits of conservation
activities of other federal and state agencies).
81 See Clark Says FWS Stands Behind Conservation Agreement Program,
ENDANGERED SPECIES & WEnLANs REP., Apr. 1997, at 16 (interview of then
FWS Director of Ecological Services, now FWS Director).
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Economic Interest Policies

The Supreme Court recently confirmed that "economic consequences are an explicit concern of the [ESA]."8 2 Indeed,
although much criticism as has been leveled against the ESA and
FWS's implementation of the statute on the basis of ecological
insensitivities, tenfold that amount has been directed in the past
several years at alleged economic insensitivities.8 3 Hence, FWS
would have been negligent and politically misguided had it pursued the Ecosystem Approach philosophy independent of the
statute's explicit concern for economic impacts. The Fair Approach effort thus represents a necessary component of administrative reform.
Implementing the FairApproach philosophy required an alternative approach, however. The principal difference between
Ecosystem Approach and Fair Approach, besides their different
perspectives, is the limitation that the ESA structurally imposes
on how the two philosophies are translated into concrete policies.
For Ecosystem Approach, we have seen that ecosystem factors
can be broadly infused into the ESA under the umbrella of the
avowed ecosystem protection purpose of the statute as a whole
that is found in section 2(c), bounded only by the species-based
approach of the implementing provisions of the law. By contrast,
economic interests are not as broadly expressed in the ESA, but
rather are sprinkled through the statutory text in specific provisions, using different words to declare the importance of economic consequences in administrative decision-making.84
Therefore, FWS must be more careful about how it implements
Fair Approach, ensuring that it can point to specific authorities
that support the infusion of economic factors as a decision-making criterion. The result is that the FairApproach agenda consists of a larger number of measures than the Ecosystem
Approach effort, but each measure assumes a more limited scope
and role than most Ecosystem Approach measures.
Approaches that FWS has downplayed in responding to economic interests, and wisely so, are those that rely significantly on
Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1168 (1997).
83 See RuhI, Section 7(a)(1), supra note 4, at 1137-42 (summarizing this body
82

of criticism).
84 For example, when designating a listed species' critical habitat, the agency
must consider the economic impacts of such action. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)

(1994).
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increased funding for land acquisition or conservation even
though the universe of possibilities for promoting landowner involvement in endangered species regulation expands exponentially when massive funding levels are hypothesized.8 Indeed,
even most preservationist groups that have proclaimed an interest in incorporating economic interests in the ESA actually only
intend measures that could come into being through significant
funding boosts.8 However, this grounding of ESA reform on
potential funding increases pays no more than lip service to the
purported goal and therefore is unrealistic. FWS and the few visionary preservationist and economic interests are to be commended for moving towards regulatory reforms that actually
merge ecological and economic interests together without the
need for unrealistic funding requests.87

85 See, e.g., DEFFNDERS OF WmnDLnF, BUILDING EcoNo~uc INCEN rIvEs
INTO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr (1993) (discussing numerous proposals,

including tax incentives and conservation subsidies, all of which require either

added ESA funding or reduced tax revenues);

NATIONAL WttLtoir FEDERAA POIuCY PosMoN PA-

TION, INVOLVING COMMUNITIES IN CONSERVATION

PER ON THE ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr 22-26

(1995) (discussing tax credits, tax

deferrals, and conservation subsidies).
86 See4 e.g., DEFENDERS OF WILDLiFE, Bui.DiNG

ECONONUC INCEN-nVES

FEDERAINO THE NDANGERED SPECIES Acr (1993); NATIONAL ,VILDLun
lION, INVOLVING COMMUNITIES IN CONSERVATION: A PoucY PosMON PAPER ON THE ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr 22-26 (1995).
87 There is a small but growing number of leaders of environmental

and economic interest groups that have stuck their necks out, possibly risking alienation within their respective "camps," to seek a middle ground. See, e.g.,
Michael J.Bean & David S. Wilcove, The Private Land Problem, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1 (1997) (officers of the Environmental Defense Fund advocate several of the programs discussed in this Section of the Article); Jason F.
Shogrun, Economics and the Endangered Species Act, ENDANGERED SPECIES
UPDATE, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 4 (economist advocates more economic research
to assist in balancing property rights and species protection). An excellent background study of many of the policies discussed in the following Section of the
Article, and which reveals the policy reforms over which preservationist and
economic interests disagreed or formed consensus, is the product of a multiparty dialogue convened in June 1995 by the Keystone Center. See THE KEYsroNE CENTER, THE KEYSTONE CENTR DIALoGuE ON INCENTMvES FOR PlVATE LANDOWNERS TO PROTEC ENDANGERED SPECIES (1995) [hereinafter
KEYSTONE DIALOGUE TO PROTECr ENDANGERED SPECIES]. Although the report covers many of the tax and funding based reforms that will not be possible
without federal financial commitment, see id. at 26-41, it also outlines the genesis and potential for many of the regulatory reforms that FWS has embraced.
See id at 1-25.
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Take CriteriaNotice

FWS explained in FairApproach that some of its measures
had already been put in place. One such measure was a policy
statement adopted in July 1994 that required the agency to identify specific activities that would be considered likely, as well as
those that would not be considered likely, to result in violation of
section 9.88 In addition, the agency agreed to identify contact
personnel to assist persons who are engaged in borderline activities not clearly falling under either category. 89 While these measures will improve awareness of endangered species for the entire
public, they will also help to allay criticisms that FWS lists species
without providing sufficient guidance to the regulated community concerning permitted and prohibited activities. 90
2.

"Best Data" Criteria

Another July 1994 policy FWS swept within the Fair Approach philosophy addresses the statutory requirements that the
agency make listing, recovery planning, interagency consultation,
and HCP permitting decisions based on the best scientific and
commercial data available. 91 The Supreme Court recently noted
88 See Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy for Endangered Species Act
Section 9 Prohibitions, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,272 (1994) (issued jointly with NMFS).
The most powerful regulatory consequence to flow from species listing, and
perhaps the most powerful regulatory provision in all of environmental law, is
found in the section 9(a) prohibition of "take" of listed animal species, making
it unlawful for "any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to...
(B) take any such species within the United States or the territorial sea of the
United States." 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(i) (1994). For an overview of the take prohibition as implemented, see Rohlf, supra note 7, at 59-71; Federico Cheever,
An Introduction to the ProhibitionAgainst Takings in Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live With A Powerful Species Preservation Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 109 (1991); Albert Gidari, The Endangered
Species Act: Impact of Section 9 on Private Landowners, 24 ENVTL. L. 419
(1994); Kilbourne, supra note 7, at 572-84; Steven P. Quarles et a., Sweet Home
and the Narrowingof Wildlife "Take" Under Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act, 26 ErvrL. L. REP. 1003 (1996).
89 See Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy for Endangered Species Act
Section 9 Prohibitions, 59 Fed. Reg. at 34,272.
90 See, e.g., Final Rule to List the Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 62 Fed. Reg. 23,377, 23,391 (1997) (describing actions which likely would
or would not cause the taking of a listed species).
91 See Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy on Information Standards
Under the Endangered Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,271 (1994) (issued jointly
with NMFS). The ESA requires that many of the factual determinations relevant to listing and protecting species be made based on the "best available"
scientific evidence, a factor which is itself subject to intense debate within the
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that the primary objective of this requirement was "to avoid
needless economic dislocation produced by agency officials [who]
zealously but unintelligently [pursue] their environmental objectives."92 To serve that goal, the agency has committed itself to
the policy that any information it uses to implement the ESA will
be reliable and credible, derived principally from primary and
original sources, and evaluated impartially.9 3 Certainly, these are
only minimum standards-but they are a good beginning towards ensuring that the spirit of the ESA is satisfied.
3. Peer Review Process
Consistent with its best available information policy, EWS
adopted another "better science" policy statement in July 1994
that required the agency "to incorporate independent peer review in listing and recovery activities, during the public comment
period ....,,94 To be sure, neutral peer review should not inherently favor either economic or preservationist interests. However, FWS presented this policy in its FairApproach agenda as
an adjunct of the best available evidence requirement, a standard
that many critics have suggested implies peer review based on
accepted scientific methods. 95 Since peer review has generally
been a reform point advanced by proponents of economic interests based on their perception that too many unwarranted listings
were slipping through the process due to lax scientific stanthe peer review
dards, 96 it is not surprising that FWS included
97
policy as one of its FairApproach measures.
scientific community. See Laurence Michael Bogert, That's My Story and Im

Stickin' to It Is the "Best Available" Science any Available Science Under the
Endangered Species Act?, 31 IDAHo L. REv. 85 (1994). For an overview of the
roles that science and the quality of science play under the ESA, see ComM. o.SCINFiC ISSUES IN THE ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr, NATIONAL RESEARCH

COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr (1995).
92 Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1168 (1997).
93 See Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy on Information Standards
Under the Endangered Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. at 34,271.

94 Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy for Peer Review in Endangered
Species Act Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,270 (1994) (issued jointly with NMFS).
95 See generally Ruhl,Section 4, supra note 28, at 71 (arguing that independent peer review may be useful to screen out errors and gaps in the agency's
information base).
96 See id

97 As of April 1997, FWS had subjected 41 final listing determinations and
68 recovery plans to peer review. See MAKING THE ESA WoRK BErrEv, supra
note 18, at 3.

HeinOnline -- 6 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 391 1997-1998

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal

N.YU. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Volume 6

4. Minimizing Social and Economic Impacts of Recovery
Programs
Another final agency policy that preceded Fair Approach,
but later fit within the FairApproach agenda, requires FWS "to
develop and implement recovery plans in a timely manner that
will minimize the social and economic consequences of plan implementation."98 Estimates indicate that full implementation of
all recovery plans would cost billions of dollars, 99 and FWS has
been perceived as conducting recovery planning with no real expectation of full implementation and no attention to economic
reality. 00 Thus, FWS has now promised to (i) assemble social
and economic expertise on recovery planning teams; (ii) solicit
input from entities potentially affected by the recovery plan
measures; and (iii) ensure that recovery plans are feasible and
realistic from social and economic perspectives. 101
5. Enlisting Landowner Support for Conservation Through
"Safe Harbor"Permits
FairApproach took full advantage of the four July 1994 policies that contained elements of reform consistent with economic
interests. But the agenda did not stop there. Several additional
policy reforms were proposed or under consideration at the time
Fair Approach was issued, and FWS has generally followed
through on each of them.
The first to result in a full-fledged policy reform addresses
the perverse system of disincentives created with respect to private landowners. These disincentives are established under the
98 Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy on Recovery Plan Participation
and Implementation Under the Endangered Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,272,
34,273 (1994) (issued jointly with NMFS).
99 FWS estimates it would cost over $4.6 billion to recover all currently
listed species. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALrrY, LINKING ECOSYSTEMS AND
BIODIVERSITY 156 (1992). Studies have estimated that it would cost almost $1
billion simply to implement the specific line-item dollar estimates made in the
306 recovery plans approved by 1993, but FWS requested only about $81 million for that purpose for FY 1995. See ROBERT GORDON AND JIM STREETEfR,
NAT'L WILDERNESS INST., GOING BROKE?: COSTS OF THE ENDANGERED SPEcLEs AcT AS REVEALED IN ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY PLANS 1 (1994).

100 See Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1), supra note 4, at 1152.
101 See Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy for the Ecosystem Approach to the Endangered Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,273. See also MAKING
THE ESA WORK BETTER, supra note 18, at 18-20 (discussing efforts on several
recovery plans to staff recovery planning teams to reflect diverse stakeholder
representation).
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ESA provisions that essentially "punish" a landowner who allows
land to become endangered species habitat. For example, a landowner who senses that suburban growth may make the property
highly valuable in twenty years may be perfectly happy to let the
property stand idle for the interim. However, vegetative cover
that is suitable for an endangered species and found generally in
the area may establish itself on the property during the interim.
In such a case, the landowner would be a fool to allow the vegetation to grow as it would greatly complicate any future sale of
the property. The landowner's solution would be to "manage"
the vegetation-perhaps through goats, controlled fire, or periodic clearing-such that the endangered species is denied any
chance of using the property, even if only temporarily. 102
FWS addressed this problem through an approach known as
"Safe Harbors." Under this approach, FWS can agree to allow a
landowner to take all listed species found on the property at a
future date beyond those present at the date of the agreement. 03
In this manner, sound land conservation measures do not come
back later to sting landowners in the form of increased ESA regulatory burdens. As FWS described in its HCP Handbook, the
purpose of the approach is "to reduce the disincentives (e.g., fear
of regulatory restrictions) that often cause landowners to avoid
or prevent land use practices that would otherwise benefit endangered species."'1 4 Thus, these agreements allow the agency
to reap the benefits of a temporarily-enhanced endangered species habitat and further allow the landowner to derive the future
economic potential of the property without added regulatory
hang-ups.105
102

As evidence of this problem, see Ted Williams, FindingSafe Harbor,Au-

DUBON, Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 26 (describing one landowner's choice to clear 600

acres of forest rather than risk the proliferation of endangered red-cockaded
woodpeckers).

103 See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr. PRIVATE LAND STRATEGIES FOR WORKING TOGETHER

3-4 (1996) (providing summary of conference proceedings).
104 HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 61, at 3-41.
105 One of the earliest published official references to Safe Harbors as a policy reform appears in connection with an HCP permit issued early in 1995 to the
Pinehurst Resort and Country Club in North Carolina with respect to the
habitat of the red-cockaded woodpecker. See U.S. FIsH AND WIWui SEIv.,
U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, NEWS RELEASE: WOODPECKERS, PRIVATE LAND.
owNERs SHARE Horms UNDER NEW "SAFE HARBOR" CONSERVATION PLAN

(1995). The main thrust of Safe Harbors has thus far been in response to redcockaded woodpecker habitat issues in states from Virginia through the south-
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Based on its early successes with the informal Safe Harbor
approach, FWS fully committed the agency down the road of reform in June 1997 with its issuance of a draft policy on Safe
Harbors 106 and a proposed rule-making to implement novel new
ESA permitting approaches to facilitate the policy. 107 The policy's central thesis is that "long-term recovery of certain species
can benefit from short-term and mid-term enhancement, restoration, or maintenance of terrestrial and aquatic habitats on nonFederal property.' 10 8 When landowners produce such short- and
mid-term net benefits to species from voluntary conservation
measures, the proposed Safe Harbor policy will authorize subsequent take of the species back to "baseline" numbers under
agreed upon conditions. 09 To provide the landowner assurances
that the deal will stick, FWS will embody the agreement in an
"enhancement of survival" permit issued pursuant to ESA section 10(a)(1)." 0 Thus, the Safe Harbor policy allows landowners
to view good land stewardship for species in a manner not inconsistent with their economic interests. Although FWS has not finalized the Safe Harbor rule as of this writing, the obvious winwin advantages offered by the policy suggest that it may be the
least precarious of the agency's permitting innovations."'
6. Proposed Exemptions for Small Landowners and LowImpact Activities
Unlike many other federal environmental laws, the ESA
does not prescribe exemptions from its proscriptive and permiteast and west to Texas. See

MAKING THE

ESA WoRK

BETTER,

supra note 18,

at 18.

106 See Announcement of Draft Safe Harbor Policy, 62 Fed. Reg. 32,178
(1997) (issued jointly with NMFS).
107 See Safe Harbor Agreements and Candidate Conservation Agreements,

62 Fed. Reg. 32,189 (1997) (issued only by FWS).
108

Announcement of Draft Safe Harbor Policy, 62 Fed. Reg. at 32,178.

109 See id. at 32,178-80.
110 Id.; see also Safe Harbor Agreements and Candidate Conservation

Agreements, 62 Fed. Reg. at 32,191-94 (proposed regulations defining Safe
Harbor permit authority and criteria).
111 Perhaps because of its obvious advantages, the Safe Harbor proposed rule
has been received relatively favorably by environmental groups as contrasted
with their opposition to the CCA proposed rule. See, e.g., Letter from Defenders of Wildlife to E. Laverne Smith, U.S. Chief, Division of Endangered Species, FWS, Re: Draft Safe Harbor Policy (Aug. 11, 1997) (supporting "proper
implementation of the safe harbor concept" ); see generally Safe Harbor Commenters Address "Baseline," OtherIssues, ENDANGERED SPEcIsS & WETLANDS
REP., Sept. 1997, at 8.
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ting measures, nor vest in FWS discretionary authority to provide
112
such relief through regulatory exemptions or general permits.
Indeed, FWS proposed to exercise the full extent of its authority
in this respect with its July 1995 proposed rule. This rule only
exempts certain small landowners and low-impact activities from
specified ESA requirements. 13 The proposal was issued with
great fanfare as part of the FairApproach agenda; 114 however, it
was really more symbolic of the boundaries that the present ESA
structure places on the FairApproach philosophy, rather than a

substantive submission.
The agency's proposal would establish an exemption from
the interagency consultation and take prohibition provisions of
the ESA for "small landowners and low impact activities that are

presumed to individually or cumulatively have little or no lasting
effect on the likelihood of survival and recovery of threatened

species."1 15 FWS is authorized to fashion exemptions only for
threatened species because these species do not automatically receive the take prohibition protection extended to endangered
species. 116 Moreover, since no authority for deviating from the
take prohibition and incidental take permitting structure of the
112 Contrast, for example, the wetlands protection program administered
under section 404 of the Clean Water Act which specifically exempts certain
activities and provides the implementing agency the authority to issue general
permits relieving additional activities from permitting requirements where certain conditions are met. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (1994) (exemptions); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(e) (1994) (general permits).
113 Proposed Rule Exempting Certain Small Landowners and Low-Impact
Activities From Endangered Species Act Requirements for Threatened Species,
60 Fed. Reg. 37,419 (1995).
114 See U.S. Dep't of Interior, News Release: Administration Proposes Endangered Species Act Exemptions for Small Landowners (1995).

115 Id. (emphasis added).

116 Section 4(d) of the ESA provides that "[t]he Secretary may by regulation
prohibit with respect to any threatened species any act prohibited under section
1538(a)(1) of this title, in the case of fish or wildlife, or section 1538(a)(2) of this
title, in the case of plants, with respect to endangered species... ." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(d) (1994). In practice, FWS and NMFS have extended the full level of
endangered species protection to all threatened species as the default position
in the absence of a specific rule curtailing that level of protection for a particular threatened species. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (1996). The proposed small
landowner/low-impact rule thus reverses the effect of the existing general rule
for the specified types of projects. For an overview of the use of section 4(d) to
protect threatened species, see Rohlf, supra note 7, at 73-77; Keith Saxe, Note,
Regulated Taking of Threatened Species Under the Endangered Species Act, 39
HAgI

NGS L. 399 (1988).
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statute exists, FWS can not extend the exemption to listed endangered species.
Only about one-fifth of all listed species fall in the
threatened category. 117 Consequently, the effect of the proposed

exemptions will be limited. FWS has stated that it would support
legislative reform that vests the agency with the discretion to promulgate similar exemptions for endangered species. For now,
however, FWS has gone as far as it reasonably can under the
ESA to provide the sort of low-impact activity exemptions that
are commonly and more broadly provided under many other federal environmental laws.
7. Streamlining Permitting Through the HCP Handbook
One of the key FairApproach measures was the HCPHandbook that, in addition to fostering the multi-species HCP focus of
the Ecosystem Approach,118 seeks primarily to streamline, simplify, and clarify the section 10(a)(1) permitting program.1 19 The
agency went beyond merely providing a comprehensive, step-bystep procedures applicable under section 10(a)(1) and instead
implemented additional measures in the HCP Handbook
designed to ease regulatory red tape without sacrificing species
protection. For example, FWS has stated that it will differentiate
between permit projects by degree of impact (i.e., low, medium,
or high), and specifically extended meaningful regulatory simplification and relief to low-impact projects.120 Such regulatory relief includes a categorical exclusion to low-impact projects from
environmental impact review under the National Environmental
Policy Act.121
Thus, the HCP Handbook delivers two unmistakable
messages: (i) an Ecosystem Approach message that the agency
will use HCPs to fulfill the species protection mandate of the law,
and (ii) a Fair Approach message that the agency will do so
through clear, sensible procedures that avoid unnecessary overregulation and will be administered with professional respect for
the regulated community. If the agency can put this latter
117 U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR,

XII

ENDAN-

BuLL. 4, July-Aug. 1997, at 28.
118 See discussion supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
119 See generally Lin, supra note 57, at 387.

GERED SPECIES

120
121

See HCP

HANDBOOK,

supra note 61, at 1-8 to 1-14.

See id. at 5-2.
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message into action, it will have gone far towards making Fair

Approach a reality.
8. Increasing Certainty With "No Surprises"
One of the most vexing qualities of the ESA for proponents
of economic interests is that the future is difficult to plan with
certainty. This is because species listings that could not reasonably have been anticipated at the time of project planning can
nonetheless result in regulatory burdens later in a project's financing and development time line. 22 Moreover, even when
measures are taken to plan around known listed species (possibly
culminating in a section 10(a)(1) HCP permit), new information
about species may evolve and the condition of the species can
change in ways not anticipated at the time of the initial planning
measures. Thus, FWS was perceptive in making a policy, known
as the "No Surprises" policy, a central feature of the Fair Approach agenda. 2
After its initial unveiling in 1994, the No Surprises policy appeared prominently in the HCP Handbook 24 and was recently
elevated to rule status.12s The policy actually dates back to the
1982 amendments adding section 10(a)(1) to the ESA and is
designed to provide greater certainty to HCP permittees. In
those amendments, Congress intended for the HCPs to "provide
long-term commitments regarding the conservation of listed ...
species and long-term assurances to the proponent of the conservation plan [such] that the terms of the plan will be adhered to
See Hoim BUILDERS PR ss, NAT'L ASS'N OF Holm Buu.DEs, DEvEt,10-11 (1996).
m See U.S. FisH AND WnmDnu SERV., U.S. D'T OF INTERIOR, No SuR-

122

OPER'S GUIDE To ENDANGERED SPECIES REGULATION

PRISES: AssURING CERTAINTY FOR LANDowNERs IN ENDANc;ERED SPIciES
Acr HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING (1994) (issued jointly wilth NMWS).

124 See HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 61, at 3-29 to 3-32; see also Notice of

Availability of Final Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 61 Fed. Reg. 63,854 (1996) (issued jointly with

NMFS) (discussing No Surprises in connection with release of the HCP Handbook). See generally Eric Fisher, Habitat ConservationPlanning Under the En-

dangered Species Act" No Surprisesand die Quest for Certainty 67 U. COLO. L
REv. 371 (1996); Lin, supra note 57, at 386.
m See Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed.
Reg. 8859, 8870-73 (1998) (amending 50 C.F.R. parts 17 and 222) (issued jointly
with NMFS). FWS agreed to promulgate the No Surprises policy as it appeared
in the HCP Handbook, or some version of it, as a regulation in settlement of a
lawsuit challenging FWS's use of the informal guidance approach for the policy.
See Spirit of the Sage v. Babbitt, No. 96-CV-2503 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 31, 1996)
(settlement agreement and stipulated dismissal dated Mar. 18, 1997).
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and that further mitigation requirements will only be imposed in
26
accordance with the terms of the plan.'
No Surprises is the long-term assurance side of that equation. It is designed to assure non-federal landowners participating in individual or regional HCPs that no additional land
restrictions or financial compensation will be required from an
HCP permittee for species adequately covered by a properly
functioning HCP. This assurance remains even if unforeseen or
12 7
extraordinary circumstances arise after the HCP is approved.
If such circumstances require additional lands or financial resources, the No Surprises policy authorizes the federal government to provide those additional resources. 128 Although some
preservationist groups have criticized the policy, 12 9 it is difficult
to envision how the FairApproach agenda could be more than an
empty promise to persons who have committed to HCP measures
unless a strong No Surprises policy is enforced.1 30 FWS acknowledged that reality by declaring that the driving force for the
adoption of a No Surprises final rule "was the absence of adequate incentives for non-Federal landowners to factor endangered species conservation into their day-to-day land
1 31
management activities."'
9. ProvidingEven More Certainty Through "Assurances"
Under the CandidateSpecies Conservation Agreements
A logical outgrowth of the No Surprises policy is an "assurances" policy for candidate conservation agreements (CCA)H.R. REP. No. 97-835, at 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2871.
See Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed.
Reg. at 8871 (adding new 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(5)); see also HCP HANDnOOK,
126
127

supra note 61, at 3-29.
128 See Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed.

Reg. at 8871 (adding new 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(6)); see also HCP HANDnOOK,
supra note 61, at 3-29 to -30.

129 See, e.g., Kimberley K. Walley, SurprisesInherent in the No Surprises Policy, ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, Oct.-Nov. 1996, at 8 (criticizing No Surprises policy); Letter from Spirit of Sage Council et al. to FWS Re: Comments

on Proposed "No Surprises" Rule (July 24, 1997) (describing the policy as "le.

gally untenable and biologically insupportable"); see generally 'No Surprises'
Comments Seek Changes in Proposal, ENDANGERED SPECIES & WETLANDS
REP., Oct. 1997, at 10.

130 See, e.g., Letter from National Association of Home Builders to FWS Re:
No Surprises Rule (July 21, 1997) (supporting the policy as "crucial to provide
certainty").
131 See Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed.

Reg. at 8860.
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another of FWS's recently announced Fair Approach agenda
items. FWS has promoted CCAs and the use of HCPs to cover
unlisted species of concern as part of its Ecosystem Approach.132
Since the No Surprises policy only applies to HCPs, however,
some form of complementary long-term assurance was needed to
promote landowner use of CCAs. Thus, given the uncertainties
and risks that impeded HCP participation before FWS adopted
No Surprises, FWS announced in November 1996 that it would
propose a CCA "Assurances" policy to promote candidate conservation.1 33 Indeed, when FWS announced its draft CCA policy
and proposed rule in June 1997, - the assurances feature played
a prominent role.
FWS recognized that while a species is unlisted, a landowner
is under no obligation to avoid taking the species. Furthermore,
costly CCA measures would be difficult to sell to a landowner if
there were a significant chance that the species could later be
listed and the landowner would face the full force of ESA take
prohibitions. Therefore, using an approach similar to Safe
Harbors, FWS determined that it will commit to issuing an incidental take permit to landowners who enter into CCAs, provided
that (i) the CCA created net benefits to the candidate species,
and (ii) the incidental take extends only to those species resources (individuals or habitat) found on the property in excess
of the baseline conditions the landowner agreed to maintain in
the CCA.135 Under those conditions, the permit will protect the
landowner should the species subsequently become listed,
notwithstanding the conservation measures provided in the
CCA.136

In this respect, the CCA assurances policy mirrors the HCP
No Surprises policy as each secures long-term commitments from
landowners on behalf of species conservation by capping landowners' long-term commitment regardless of future contingenSee discussion supra notes 56-81 and accompanying text.
See Laverne Smith, U.S. Fish and Wddlife Serv., Candidate Species &
Candidate Conservation Agreements for Private Landowners 3, prepared for
the National Education and Training Center/Conservation Fund, The Endangered Species Act Private Land Strategiesfor Working Together (Nov. 13-14,
1996).
134 See discussion supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
135 See Announcement of Draft Policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements, 62 Fed. Reg. at 32,185-86.
132
133

136 See

id.
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cies. Together, these policies form an essential part of the Fair
Approach agenda.
II
AN

AGENDA FOR ADDITIONAL (AND BROADER)
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

Both the Ecosystem Approach and Fair Approach agendas
have had a significant effect on the ESA program as a whole, but
neither appears to be more dominant than the other. Perhaps
the best sign that FWS has been on target thus far with its administrative reform agenda is that few of its measures have garnered
consensus approval from either the preservationist or economic
interest camps and several reforms have been subjected to intense criticism from both camps. Since neither camp appears
willing to voluntarily share the risk that is necessary to shape a
balanced approach to ESA implementation on a programmatic
basis for the long term, FWS has forced risk-sharing upon them.
FWS should not only continue this trend, but should also
broaden its scope. Many of the measures FWS has adopted are
baby steps compared to what could be undertaken. Although
FWS had to move cautiously at first in both translating the underlying philosophies into real implementation measures and invoking reactions by Congress and interest groups to those
measures, sufficient momentum is present for FWS to broaden
its attack. Indeed, measures such as the HCPHandbook and the
CCA initiative suggest that opportunities exist for melding
Ecosystem Approach and Fair Approach measures into unified
policy reforms. Such measures plainly illustrate how ecosystem
and economic interests can be mutually reinforcing and thereby
more resistant to sniping.
In this Section, several measures that may be consistent with
this strategy are briefly described. These measures are by no
means exhaustive,'137 but FWS would be imprudent to leave any
of the following items out of its future administrative reform of
137 For other reform proposals that have touched to some degree on the opportunities for administrative reforms without congressional action, see KEY.
STONE DIALOGUE TO PROTECr ENDANGERED SPEcIEs, supra note 87; Michael
J. Bean & David S. Wilcove, Ending the Impasse, ENVTn. F., July-Aug. 1996, at
22; Edward C. Beedy, Ten Ways to Fix the Endangered Species Act, ENDANGERED SPEcIss UPDATE, June 1995, at 12.

HeinOnline -- 6 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 400 1997-1998

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal

1998]

CONGRESS?-AN AGENDA FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

401

the ESA. These measures may also lay the groundwork for a
start to meaningful legislative reform.
A. Ecosystem Interests
FWS's Ecosystem Approach gives life to the ESA's purported ecosystem protection purpose largely through the speciesbased provisions of the statute. There are two provisions of the
ESA, however, that offer FWS a broader front for integrating
ecosystem-based measures into the Ecosystem Approach
philosophy.
1. Section 7(a)(1): Issue Regulations Implementing Federal
Agencies' Duty to Conserve Species
The MOU on section 7(a)(1) was a significant step towards
unleashing the potential usefulness of the conservation duty as
an ecosystem protection tool.U8 Unlike the powerful, but narrowly-focused take prohibition and permitting requirements
found elsewhere in the statute, the affirmative duty to conserve
species permeates federal programs without establishing overt
proscriptions and coercive requirements. 39 Thus, section 7(a)(1)
offers the planning flexibility that is necessary for successful
ecosystem protection efforts. Before the MOU, the federal agencies' duty to conserve species sat as a largely untapped source of
energy for the Ecosystem Approach agenda.
Although the MOU is neither self-executing nor enforceable, the plain language of section 7(a)(1) demands both. Section
7(a)(1) requires federal agencies to carry out their conservation
1 40
duty "in consultation with and with the assistance of [FWS].
Furthermore, precisely the same language in section 7(a)(2) has
spawned over ten pages of regulatory text,' 4 ' over one-hundred
pages of proposed formal guidance, 42 and tens of thousands of
consultation contacts between FWS and other federal agenSee discussion supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
139 See Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1), supra note 4, at 1122.
140 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1994).
141 See 50 C.F.R. pt. 402 (1996).
142 See U.S. FISH AN Wxm~uu SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF ImrTEmiOR ENrANGERED SPECIES CONSULTATION HANDBOOK (Draft 1994) [hereinafter Co.suL138

TATIoN HANDBOOK].
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cies. 143 By contrast, FWS's regulations mention the conservation
duty in one short paragraph in which, contrary to the statute's
plain intent, the duty is described as optional,' 44 and absolutely
no other formal guidance beyond the MOU is available. 145
Clearly, if the conservation duty is to be given any chance of
breathing life into the Ecosystem Approach agenda, FWS must
give life to it first. Other federal agencies can hardly be blamed
46
for ignoring their conservation duty if FWS ignores it as well.
Only by promulgating meaningful regulations detailing how federal agencies should consult on their conservation duties and the
standards by which their actions will be measured, as well as by
actively assisting the other agencies in carrying out that effort,
can FWS fulfill the potential of section 7(a)(1) as an important
contribution to the Ecosystem Approach philosophy.
2. Section 5: Reorient HabitatAcquisition Efforts to
Ecosystem-Wide Protection of Endangered Species
"Hot Spots"
Although there is considerable debate over how far the principle should be carried, the unmistakable message emerging from
conservation biology literature is that ecosystem protection and
habitat preservation go hand in hand.1 47 The ESA's species143 See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, REPORT TO
CONGRESS: RECOVERY PROGRAM 22 (1994) (noting that FWS conducted over
70,000 consultation contacts from 1987 through 1991).
144 See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(6) (1996).
145 See CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 142, at 4-60 (stating in 1994
that FWS is developing "comprehensive guidance" for section 7(a)(1), though

no mention of any regulations was made).

146 One federal court recently ordered a federal agency to consult with FWS
"to develop ... the implementation of an organized program utilizing [the
agency's] authorities for the conservation of... endangered and threatened
species as contemplated by ESA § 7(a)(1)." Sierra Club v. Glickman, No. MO95-CA-91, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Tex. July 2, 1996).
147 The typical policy prescription in conservation biology circles is to simply
say that "maintaining as much wild land as possible is the most viable option."
Michael J. Samways, The Art of Unintelligent Tinkering, 10 CONSERVATION BI.
OLOGY 1307 (1996). Some conservation biologists concede, however, that this
is not a very helpful policy guideline as it suggests no end boundary to preservation. See John M. Hagan, Environmentalism and the Science of Conservation
Biology, 9 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 975 (1995). The central problem in defining such a boundary is that "the relationship between socioeconomic factors
and biodiversity loss is not well understood." Deborah J. Forester & Gary E.
Machlis, Modeling Human Factors That Affect the Loss of Biodiversity, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY

1253, 1253 (1996).

Hence, "[p]resently there is no

method to determine how much land should be protected to preserve an
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based focus has made it difficult for FWS to implement that policy through direct regulation, a political reality that is unlikely to
change in the foreseeable future. However, one provision of the
ESA frees FWS from its species-based handcuffs without forcing
the political rumble that comes with coercive regulatory options.
Section 5 directs FWS to "establish a program to conserve fish,
wildlife, and plants, including those which are listed as endangered species or threatened species,"'148 and authorizes FWS to
acquire land to carry out such programs. 49 Therefore, for purposes of species conservation, land acquisition is not limited to
the protection of listed species, nor is it limited to a species-byspecies approach. Rather, FWS could focus its land acquisition
efforts under the ESA entirely on ecosystem protection purposes
that would maximize conservation for all species as a whole.
Indeed, a recent scientific study demonstrates that "hot
spots" of listed species occur in certain parts of the nation, such
that "a large proportion of endangered species can be protected
on a small proportion of land. If conservation efforts and funds
can be expanded in a few key areas, it should be possible to conserve endangered species with great efficiency.1150 However,
FWS's land acquisition and recovery spending has been anything
but efficient or targeted. A high proportion of the agency's recovery expenditures is devoted to a relatively small number of
species,' 51 and the agency has spent over 200 million dollars on
land acquisition efforts that correspond only loosely with the
identified hot spots. 5 2 Therefore, FWS should make every effort
in the future to expend its recovery and land acquisition funds
ecosystem's integrity." Steven R. Beissinger et al., Null Models for Assessing

Ecosystem Conservation Priorities, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOoY 1343, 1344
(1996).
148 16 U.S.C. § 1534(a) (1994).
149 See id. § 1534(a)(2).
150 A.P. Dobson et al., GeographicDistributionof EndangeredSpecies in the
United States, 275 Sci. 550, 550 (1997).
151

See U.S. FIsH AND WILDLIFE

SERV,

U.S.

DEP'T OF INTERIOR, REPORT TO

supra note 143, at 29. FVS has been criticized for spending the vast majority of its recovery planning and implementation budget on ten popular "calendar species." See, e.g., Robert J. Barro,
FederalProtection-OnlyCute CrittersNeed Apply, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1994,
at A12 (during the period from 1989 through 1991, FWS distributed S171 million on recovery efforts for just ten species).
152 See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF INTEioi, LAND AND
CoNGREss: RECOVERY PROGRAM,

WATER

CONSERVATION

FUND,

LAND

PURCHASE

OBuIrATONS FY

1967

Through 1993 (1994).
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such that ecosystem protection value in hot spot areas is secured.
Where those hot spots overlay areas of booming land markets
and economic development, FWS's ecosystem conservation
funding support will be even more usefully targeted.
B.

Economic Interests

1. Section 10(a)(1): Issue Regulations Implementing HCP
Permit Program
Incidental take permitting through section 7(a)(2) interagency consultations and section 10(a)(1) HCPs should proceed
using roughly the same procedures and standards of evaluation.
The interagency consultation process, guided by detailed regulations, has been used extensively. Indeed, that process is now so
regularized that FWS can process thousands of consultations
each year and issue formal proposed guidance covering virtually
every question and contingency. 153 By contrast, HCP experience
is relatively thin, and is only guided by the HCP Handbook issued by FWS before promulgating meaningful implementing regulations. Many of the streamlining measures outlined in the
HCP Handbook sound promising to economic interests. However, in practice, such measures may be unfulfilled to the extent
that they remain unenforceable.
Hence, to place the HCP process on a par with interagency
consultations, thereby priming the HCP process experience to
match the breadth and depth of the interagency consultation process, FWS needs to fill the regulatory gap. The core of the new
FWS regulations should consist of the most important of the
HCP Handbook streamlining measures, including application
processing times, categorical exclusions from other statutory review procedures, and permit evaluation standards. When economic interests see FWS commit to its streamlining measures
with enforceable regulations, they will be more likely to perceive
the Fair Approach agenda as an integral part of the ESA
program.
2. Sections 7(a)(2) and 10(a)(1): Endorse and Establish
Protocolsfor Habitat Mitigation Banking
With the CCA Assurances, Safe Harbors, and HCP No Surprises policies, FWS has taken great strides at reversing the illog153

See Houck, supra note 7, at 318.
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ical, counterproductive incentives landowners face under the
ESA. The next step will be to endorse and establish a habitat
mitigation banking program that allows landowners to create and
market ecosystem protection values more widely than will be
possible even under the recent administrative reforms.
Habitat mitigation banking is not a new idea. It has enjoyed
a long, although often controversial, tradition under the wetlands
program administered under section 404 of the Clean Water
Act.154 In its most basic form, banking simply allows a landowner to provide habitat conservation values today in one location and then later "consume" or "sell" that banked value by
habitat destruction actions taken by that person or others elsewhere. The advantage of the banking approach is that it divorces
decisions about the size of a habitat conservation area from the
specific project-by-project impact evaluation required by the permitting program, and therefore larger and more contiguous preserves than might otherwise be possible are allowed.155 Given
this potential, mitigation banking under section 404 has many
154 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994). Impacts that cannot be avoided or further reduced in intensity require that the project applicant provide compensatory mitigation for wetlands degradation and losses. See 40 C.F.R. §233.23(c)(9) (1996).
The Army Corps of Engineers ("the Corps") and EPA in 1990 developed a
memorandum of agreement defining wetlands mitigation policies consistent
with the section 404(b)(1) guidelines. See 55 Fed. Reg. 9210 (1990); see generally Margot Zallen, The MitigationAgreement-A MajorDevelopment in Wet-

land Regulation, 7 NAT. REsoucrs & ENV'T, Summer 1992, at 19.
Recognizing the importance of mitigation to the section 404 program, in 1993,
the Corps and EPA issued a joint internal guidance document to establish general guidelines for the establishment and use of wetlands mitigation banks
under section 404. See U.S. E.P.A. AND U.S. DmE'T OF ARMY, MEMORANDUM
TO THE FIELD: E STABmIS-mNT AND USE OF WETLAND MITIGATION BANKS iN

Acr SECTON 404 REGULATORY PROGRAht (Aug. 23,
1993). In 1995, the agencies joined with FWS and other federal conservation
agencies to issue yet another wetlands mitigation banking guidance policy. See
Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation
Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. 58,605 (1995). For a detailed discussion of the wetland
mitigation banking program and other wetland restoration and creation initiatives, see Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation
Banking, and Takings, 81 IowA L. REv. 527 (1996); William NV. Sapp, Mitigation Banking: Panacea or Poison for Wetlands Protection, 1 ENvmn. LAw. 99
(1994); Jonathan Silverstein, Taking Wetlands to the Bank. The Role of Wetland
Mitigation Banking in a Comprehensive Approach to Wetlands Protection, 22
B.C. ENvm.- A . L. REv. 129 (1994); Robert D. Sokolove & Pamela D.
Huang, Privatization of Wetland Mitigation Banking, 7 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T, Summer 1992, at 36.
155 See Gardner, supra note 154, at 558-59.
THE CLEAN WATER
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supporters from both the biological and administrative
perspectives.
Particularly since recent scientific research suggests the presence of endangered species hot spots in the nation, 156 FWS
should give serious thought to adopting mitigation banking approaches for the ESA. At present, the ESA creates no incentive
to establish such habitat preserves banks, but nothing in the ESA
would prevent FWS from recognizing mitigation banks and incorporating them into the section 7(a)(2) and section 10(a)(1) incidental take permitting programs. As long as habitat mitigation
already is allowed under both of those programs, and FWS must
thereby develop standards for measuring mitigation requirements for individual projects, it is difficult to foresee the disadvantages to ecosystem or economic interests that mitigation
banking could pose.
The advantages of mitigation banking include easing the
burden to project applicants of locating and purchasing suitable
mitigation properties, simplifying the negotiation of mitigation
requirements, and securing the benefits of larger habitat preserves on behalf of the Ecosystem Approach agenda in advance
of the habitat losses associated with subsequent development.
Therefore, mitigation banking presents the potential for the kind
of win-win policy outcome that has made FWS's Safe Harbor
policy so resoundingly popular thus far.
III
SCORECARD FOR THE 105TH CONGRESS

On September 15, 1997, with great fanfare and purportedly
after much political negotiation, an ESA reform bill with bipartisan sponsorship was introduced in the Senate. 157 The bill, S.
1180, covers many areas of ESA programs not addressed in the
FWS reform agenda, but it clearly was shaped by that agenda in
many respects. Since a long road with many changes potentially
See Dobson et al., supra note 150.
See Endangered Species Recovery Act of 1997, S. 1180, 105th Cong.
(1997). The bill was sponsored by Senators Kempthorne (R. Idaho.), Chafee
(R. Rhode Island), Baucus (D. Montana), and Reid (D. Nevada), who appeared jointly at a press conference to emphasize the bipartisan process that led
to the bill. See Endangered Species Recovery Act of 1997 (visited Sept. 24,
1997) <http://www.senate.gov/-Kempthorne/esca.html>; Press Conference,
(visited Sept. 24, 1997) <http'//www.senate.gov/-epw/pres-916.htm>. The bill
was reported out of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works
156
157
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lies ahead, a summary "scorecard" of how the bill relates to the
FWS agenda as of this writing is necessary:
Ecosystem Approach Scorecard
FWS ADnmmS'rATrE REFORm
Ecosystem approach for the ESA

S. 1180 LEGILATIVE REspo'sn

The words ecosystem, biodiversity, and
ecology do not appear in S. 1180
Ecosystem orientation for recovery plans New ESA section 5(b)(2) would require
recovery plans to address multiple
species "dependent on the same habitat"
(see S. 1180 § 3(b))
New ESA section 51)(2) would require
Implementing ESA section 7(a)(1)
federal agencies to enter into recovery
plan "implementing agreements" with
FWS at least two years from adoption of
a plan, though the terms of the
agreements would be in the "sole
discretion" of FWS and the agencies (see
S. 1180 § 3(b))
S. 1180 contains no provisions relevant
Consider ecological setting in listing of
to this policy
distinct populations
New ESA section 10(a)(3) would
Promote regional, multi-species Habitat
authorize "multiple species conservation
Conservation Plans
plans" that could cover listed and
unlisted species (see S. 1180 § 5(c))
Adopt proactive Candidate Conservation New ESA section 10(k) would
substantially adopt FWS's policy
Agreements
framework (see S. 1180 § 5(d))

FairApproach Scorecard
S. 1180 LErxsLATrn RESPONSE
New ESA section 9(h) would require
FWS to respond to individual inquiries
regarding whether an action would cause
a take (see S. 1180 § 9(c)), but no
general guidance would be required in
listing rules
New ESA section 3(b)(1) would require
"Best data" criteria
FWS to "give greater weight to data that
is empirical, field tested, or peer
reviewed" (see S. 1180 § 2(a)(3))
New ESA section 4(b)(10) would require
Peer reviews for listings
peer review of listings by threc-member
panels selected from a list compiled by
the National Science Foundation (see S.
1180 § 2(c)(9))
Minimize social and economic impacts of New ESA section 5(e)(2)(B) would
require that recovery plans contain a
recovery plans
description of economic impacts and that
they be designed and implemented with
an "appropriate balance" betwen
recovery goals and the socio-economic
I impact (see S. 1180 § 3(b))
I_
TqsrRnA
REF.oiRi
FWS ADnr
Take criteria notice in listing rules
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FairApproach Scorecard (continued)
FWS ADnmsamxATrWE REFoRM

S. 1180 LEoisLAmvE R SPONSE

Safe Harbors

New ESA section 10(1) would
substantially adopt FWS's policy

framework (see S. 1180 § 5(0)
Develop general permits for low-impact
projects

New ESA section 10(a)(4) would
authorize FWS to develop general
permits for categories of "low effect"
actions (see S. 1180 § 5(c))

Streamline HCP permitting

S. 1180 contains no provisions relevant
to this policy

No Surprises

New ESA section 10(a)(5) would
substantially adopt l7VS's policy
framework (see S. 1180 § 5(c))

Candidate Conservation Agreement
assurances

New ESA section 10(k) would
substantially adopt FwS's policy
framework (see S. 1180 § 5(d))

In general, the scorecards show that FWS's Ecosystem Approach and Fair Approach administrative reform agendas have
made many advances toward shaping legislative reform of the
ESA. It is noteworthy that the FWS agenda, which thus far has
balanced the Ecosystem Approach and Fair Approach themes,

surfaced in many provisions of the first bipartisan ESA reform
effort that has been initiated in Congress in many years. The
challenge, of course, will be in holding the center together and
keeping the measures intact. Through FWS's expression of support for S. 1180 with only minor amendments, 153 FWS has
demonstrated that it is ready to continue to fight that fight in the
legislative as well as in the administrative arena.
on October 31, 1997. See S. Rep. No. 105-128, at 121 (1997). As of this writing,
no further action has been taken in the Senate. Another ESA reform bill, written by and introduced on behalf of preservationist groups, was introduced in
the House in July 1997, where it stands little chance of moving substantially or

of influencing the final language of any ESA reform measure that passes in the
105th Congress. See Endangered Species Recovery Act of 1997, H.R. 2351,
105th Cong. (1997). See generally Enviros Cheer Miller ESA Bill, ENDAN.
GERED SPECIES & WETLANDS REp., Aug. 1997, at 1. As of this writing, the
House has taken no further action on comprehensive ESA reform.
158 See The Endangered Species Recovery Act of 1997: Hearings on S. 1180
Before the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 105th Cong. 1 (1997)
(statement of Jamie Rappaport Clark, Director of the U. S. Fish and Wildlife
Serv.). None of FWS's suggested amendments relate to the provisions of the
bill that involve FWS's reforms. See ESA Bill ClearsSenate Environment Panel
Easily, ENDANGERED SPECIES AND WETLANDS REP., Oct. 1997 (describing
amendments).
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CONCLUSION

The radical center is pleased! In the face of congressional
paralysis, hostile constituents from all sides, and an unpredictable
and often uncooperative federal judiciary, FWS has managed to
muster the political will to forge a balanced ESA reform agenda.
Unfortunately, the deck is stacked against FWS's administrative
reform effort: (i) the agency has insufficient funding to develop
strong ecological and economic programs; (ii) many of its administrative reforms are supported by ambiguous statutory text at
best; (iii) landowners will be skeptical of FWS's efforts after
many years of animosity; (iv) partisan politics have delayed the
opportunity for legislative guidance; and (v) extreme preservationists and property rights groups make strange bedfellows in
trying to block almost every move FWS makes. It is a wonder
the agency even bothers since it would be much easier to simply
hide behind the status quo and blame the stalemate on Congress.
Despite these obstacles, FWS has managed to put an impressive administrative reform agenda in place. However, the longer
Congress hangs the agency out to dry without offering an endorsement or alternative approach, the more chance the entire
effort has of unraveling. The string of litigation losses that FWS's
Candidate Conservation Agreement policy has suffered demonstrates how close the agency is to that precipice. The real question is not whether FWS is willing to come close to the edge (it
already has), but rather whether Congress will let the agency fall
over the edge without a rope.
Indeed, the ESA situation may provide students with a laboratory of broader issues of constitutional and administrative law
for observing the pitfalls of Congress's addiction to delegation of
legislative authority to administrative agencies. The ESA is representative of the common story in which Congress hands enormous responsibilities to an administrative agency and then hides
its head in the sand for well over a decade. Although critics from
both the preservationist and property rights camps accuse FWS
of sleeping with the enemy, perhaps the agency is doing the best
job one reasonably can expect as long as neither side is completely happy.
In a perfect world, Congress would make the tough decisions, agencies would know and do just what was expected of
them, and courts would need to stick their necks in matters only
when one of the other two institutions went haywire. Congress
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reneged on that covenant long ago and one should not hold one's
breath for Congress to change its act. However, as long as FWS
continues to fly in the face of convention and seek balanced ESA
reform at the administrative level, its efforts should be
applauded.
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